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China has focused on improving its image in the world by relying more on its 
“soft power” by investing billions of dollars simply to convince the world to accept its 
rise in the international system. This paper uses both quantitative and qualitative methods 
in order to grade and assess China’s success with these efforts. While I could not find any 
significant relationship between China’s tools of soft power and its positive 
perception building in the international community, I could also not find any 
significant effect of China’s rise on its negative perception building among the 
international community. This may, in and of itself, be a significant result. More 
specifically, the research reveals that many of the ideals held by China significantly 
clash with existing international norms, that China lacks credibility in the exercise of 
its public diplomacy, and that China relies too heavily on the attractiveness of its 
culture. 
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 1 
I. CHINA’S SOFT POWER: CHANGING THE WORLD 
PERCEPTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power”1 presented about two decades ago, created 
a debate among scholars and policy makers to consider another source of influence, 
excluding military and economic might. Decision makers have tried to incorporate the 
concept of soft power while utilizing the tools of culture and public diplomacy to reshape 
their states’ foreign policies. Policy makers are making efforts to promote their cultural 
values to advance their public outreach. As per a Japanese Foreign Ministry statement,  
In recent years in particular, against the backdrop of the dramatic advance 
of the Internet and other information and communications technology, as 
well as the progress of democratization around the world, public opinion 
has a growing influence on foreign policy. Accordingly, many observers 
have stressed the importance of “public diplomacy” - direct appeals to 
citizens and public opinion in other countries in cooperation with the 
private sector. From this perspective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan utilizes various public relations tools to provide international 
audiences with information about Japan’s foreign policy and general 
information on Japan.2  
Correspondingly, analysts are also employing the concept of soft power while 
referring to states’ intangible resources to examine how these states are influencing the 
behavior and decisions of others. In the past, the focus of studies had been on the United 
States, the European Union, Canada, and India.3 However, China has recently been the 
prime focus of most of the scholars who are trying to measure the effectiveness of 
Chinese soft power, based on the efforts of Beijing to expand Chinese influence through 
its promotion of cultural values and public diplomacy.  
                                                 
1 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft power.”Foreign Policy”, no. 80. (1990): 153–171. 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Public Diplomacy, 
 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/public_diplomacy.html, accessed November 5, 2015. 
3 Todd Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical 
Category,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 190. 
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China’s rise, the impact it has on world affairs, and its perceived influence in 
global peace stability is an intensely debated issue, not only among international scholars, 
but in Chinese academic circles as well. ‘China threat theory’, for example, has been 
forwarded by many, which focuses on China’s ‘hard power’ to coerce or induce other 
states by use of its military or economic means. In this information age, however, soft 
sources of power, or soft use of ‘hard power’ attributes are also considered as ‘sine qua 
non for a state’s great power image. During the last decade, China’s ‘soft power’ has 
gotten the attention of many strategists. If among Chinese scholars the focus of 
discussion is on which concept of soft power is more suitable for China, and what sources 
or tools should China use to expand Chinese influence through its soft power, the 
international scholars are analyzing the success that China’s soft power has achieved or 
otherwise. Many American scholars are also concerned about the increasing influence of 
China’s ‘Charm Offensive’4 and its implications for the United States.5    
Over the past decade, China has focused on improving its image in the world by 
relying more on its “soft power”6 tools, and the results of different opinion polls, despite 
a few ups and downs, are proof of China’s endeavors toward this end. By joining the 
World Trade Organization and a variety of regional organizations, assisting with 
nonproliferation issues, contributing to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and 
settling territorial disputes with its neighbors, China is giving a message that what China 
wants is only a “peaceful rise.”7 
If on the one hand China is signing strategic partnerships in Latin America, it is 
winning oil and gas deals in Africa; and Chinese films are getting more popular in the 
Philippines than American movies.8 While this upward trend of China’s soft power is 
                                                 
4 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
5 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, 2005; 
Jean A. Garrison, “China’s Prudent Cultivation of ‘Soft Power’ and Implications for U.S. Policy in East 
Asia,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 32, no. 1 (2005): 25–30.  
6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
7 Nye, Jr. Soft Power, 88. 
8  Kurlantzick. Charm Offensive, How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, ix. 
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evident in certain parts of the world, what is to be seen is how China is trying to improve 
its image in the rest of the world and what is the degree of success that China’s soft 
power has achieved? This paper is an effort to answer this question. After elaborating the 
concept of soft power as viewed by different scholars and the tools to be used to this end, 
I try to explain how China has used these tools and what the implications are during this 
perception building process.  
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This paper examines the role of ‘soft power’ in the emergence of China as a world 
power. Rather than focus on material instruments of power, such as foreign aid, this 
paper focuses on China’s efforts to shape perception and the cultural aspects of its 
diplomacy. The following section closely examines the concept of soft power explaining 
Nye’s initial work and follow-on debates. This section then concludes with specific 
hypotheses/implications/predictions that shape the empirical chapters that follow. The 
third section examines China’s rise over the last few decades and sketches out the debate 
over the significance of this rise. On one end of the debate are those that see China as a 
serious threat to the status quo of the system. Others, however, see China as a normal 
power whose rise is not a threat. The significance of this chapter is to establish, to some 
degree, an empirical ‘baseline’ against which China’s soft power efforts can be assessed. 
The fourth section surveys China’s soft power efforts. The fifth section grades/assesses 
China’s success with these efforts. The key finding is that there is no significant relation 
between China’s tools of soft power and its positive perception-building in the 
international community. I could also not find, however, any significant impact of 
China’s rise on negative perception building about China. The thesis concludes with a 
summary, conclusions, and implications.  
 4 
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II. DEFINING SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Power is difficult to define. “Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it 
and talks about it, but few understand it.”9 The dictionary defines power as “the ability to 
get the outcomes one wants”10 and “having the capabilities to affect the behavior of 
others to make those things happen.”11 Power can be defined as “to make others do what 
they would otherwise not do.”12 Together, power is “the ability to influence the behavior 
of others to get the outcomes one wants.”13  
Generally, most scholars separate hard power and soft power. Normally, hard 
power is associated with military and economic strength, while soft power is a bit more 
difficult to define. However, both aim to affect the behavior of others.14 In essence, the 
differentiating factors between the two are in the access to resources as well as in the 
underlying behavior of the party in question.15 In Nye’s perspective, this difference lies 
in a spectrum with command and co-optive powers on two opposite ends. Command 
power is defined as the capacity to alter what others do,16 while co-optive power is the 
capability to alter what others desire.17 Hard power, then, is usually associated with the 
command end, whereas soft power is typically identified with co-optive ability.18 
There are generally two schools of thought on sources of soft power, and that 
difference of opinion is rooted in the perspective that each side has about soft power. Nye 
defined it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments,” and the sources of soft power are “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, 
                                                 
9 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1. 
10  Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 8. 
13 Ibid., 2. 






political ideals and policies.”19 Nye distinctively categorized power into military power, 
economic power, and soft power and left no room for their overlap. Joshua Kurlantzick, 
on the other hand, incorporated elements of economic power with soft power, combining 
the two under soft power.20 In Nye’s view, economic power presents itself as a type of 
“carrot” or “stick” and should not be included in soft power. Economic power induces 
instead of attracts another country to do something.   
Elizabeth Economy complemented the original definition offered by Joseph Nye 
by saying, “people often conflate soft power with investment and economic development, 
but I define it as culture, education, and diplomacy.”21 Hall, though, agrees with Nye’s 
concept of soft power, but he argues “although Nye’s concept lends itself for use in 
policy debates, it is not suited for deployment as an analytic tool.”22 Hall also finds Nye’s 
mechanism problematic with regard to sources of soft power and its intended effects.23 
He suggests disaggregation of the concept into separate soft powers using different 
mechanisms:  “institutional power, representational power, and reputational power.”24 
By focusing on a nation’s perceived reputation, then, tools such as game theory 
could be used as tools to predict actions a nation may take to maintain or build an image. 
As Jonathan Mercer states, “a reputation is a belief that someone has an enduring 
characteristic. More precisely, a reputation is a dispositional attribute that is then used to 
predict or explain future behavior.”25 Consequently, governments have reason to be 
concerned about their perceived reputation because other governments predict their future 
behavior based on this initial perception. Normally, realists have a tendency to hone in on 
                                                 
19  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004), x. 
20 Joshua Kurlantzick. “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 47 (June 2006): 1. 
 21 Chen Jia and Ding Qingfen, “Overseas officials head to Chinese classrooms” (China Daily), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/05/content_11098280.htm  
22 Todd Hall, ‘An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical 
Category’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 190. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 190–191 
25 Jonathan Mercer. "Rationality and psychology in international politics." International 
Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 77. 
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reputation as a tool in international confrontation. In this sense, reputation becomes 
useful not only in leading to resolution during negotiations, but also in deterring hostile 
behavior from opponents.26  
On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists consider the essence of the 
reputation of a state by evaluating it against the norms of international cooperation. As 
stated by Robert Keohane,  
to a government that values its ability to make future agreements, 
reputation is a crucial resource; and the most important aspect of an 
actor’s reputation in world politics is the belief of others that it will keep 
its future commitments even when a particular situation, myopically 
viewed, makes it appear disadvantageous to do so.27  
Nye assumes that national image-building relies on both a country’s hard power and soft 
power. He supports his argument by elaborating that some countries are well respected by 
others despite being small in size and power, whereas other countries, regardless of their 
actual influence, have compromised their national interest as a result of an unfavorable 
national image.28 
Soft power can only breed if political values and foreign policies align with 
universal beliefs. Domestic or foreign policies that are viewed as “hypocritical, arrogant, 
indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests 
can undermine soft power.”29 Morgenthau considers the depth of diplomacy in the 
international realm—despite being an unquantifiable and indefinite attribute of national 
power—the primary element. Diplomacy “is the brains of national power, as morale is its 
soul.” In other words, while a nation may possess substantial capabilities, if its diplomacy 
is lacking, it “must yield to one whose diplomacy is prepared to make the most of 
whatever other elements of power are at its disposal, thus making up through its own 
                                                 
26 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, 
Politics, and Everyday Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). 
27 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 116. 
28 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 545–559. 
29 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 14. 
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excellence for deficiencies in other fields.”30 Likewise, Morgenthau suggests that 
“nations must rely on the quality of their diplomacy to act as a catalyst for the different 
factors that constitute their power.”31 Neoliberal theorist Robert Keohane, influenced to 
some degree by realism, contends that  
regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or ‘intervening variables,’ 
between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the 
international distribution of power on the one hand and the behavior of 
states and non-state actors such as the multinational corporations on the 
other.32  
Nye also believes that  
if [a state] can establish international norms consistent with its society, it 
is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make 
other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant 
state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard 
power.33  
To summarize, soft power is changing the desire and held perception of the 
domestic and international community. To achieve that desired objective, the decisions of 
target public and elites should not be based on persuasion or inducement. Those decisions 
should also be free of the fear of the consequences following that decision. Generally 
‘culture, political values, and foreign policy’ are considered as sources of soft power, but 
cannot be limited to only these. The sources of power normally associated with ‘hard 
power,’ like military and economic power, can also be utilized in creating the good will 
of a particular state if the sole purpose of such sources is not to deter or induce other 
states to get the desired outcome. Employment of troops on United Nations peacekeeping 
missions, humanitarian assistance, or economic help to poor countries to lift the living 
standards of their countries are such examples. But irrespective of the type of sources 
used, soft power can only achieve its set goals if the values/principles of those sources 
align with universal beliefs.  
                                                 
30 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., rev. 
Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 159.  
31 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 140.  
32 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 64. 
33 Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” 80. 
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Based on the arguments presented in this chapter on the concept of soft power, 
chapter IV will compare Chinese ideas on the same concept. But before that, I felt it more 
pertinent to discuss arguments of various international scholars and policy makers who 
are apprehensive of China’s rise and consider it a threat to global peace. Next chapter will 
first discuss neorealist opinions as the foundation of ‘China’s threat theory’. The concern 
of these observers encompasses three spheres: military, economic, and ideological. 
Another alarming aspect is the surge in China’s energy demands over the last few 
decades, which is feared as a trigger for war between China and other industrialized 
countries especially United States. Then the claims and predictions made by these 
scholars will be analyzed in light of present and projected capabilities of China in each 
sphere. Fundamentally, however, the debate would center on China’s capabilities and 
intentions to see what challenges are there for Chinese soft power.  
  
 10 
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III. DEBATING CHINA’S RISE 
China’s rapid rise of the last few decades has generated debate among observers. 
The concern of these observers encompasses three spheres: military, economic, and 
ideological. Another alarming aspect is the surge in China’s energy demands over the last 
few decades. To sustain its economic growth and run its industries, China is improving its 
relations with all countries with energy sources. If on one hand it is considered a better 
sign, on the other side, it is also believed that it may trigger an energy war between China 
and other industrial states in general and with the United States in particular. As stated by 
the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Most of the publics surveyed view China’s growing 
military power with concern but continue to see China’s economic growth as a good 
thing for their own country. But in a number of countries, the impression that China’s 
economic growth poses a threat is on the rise.”34 In a public opinion survey conducted in 
2005, “31 percent believed that China will soon dominate the world … and 54 percent 
believed that the emergence of China as a superpower is a threat to world peace.”35 
In the military sphere, the increase in Chinese defense expenditures over the 
years, which the Chinese consider necessary to replace its vintage equipment to enhance 
its defensive war-fighting capability, is alarming for other states that believe this 
modernization might be for offensive purposes. According to a 2007 Congressional 
Research Service report,  
[o]bservers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is 
to field a force that can succeed in a short duration conflict with Taiwan 
and act as an anti-access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the 
arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict.36 
                                                 
34 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Unease with Major World Powers (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center), June 27, 2007, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256. , 41.  
35 Ipsos-Reid, A Public Opinion Survey of Canadians and Americans About China (poll prepared for 
the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and Canada Institute on North American Issues) (Washington, 
DC: Ipsos-Reid), June 2005, 41. 
36 O'Rourke, Ronald, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33153) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service), February 7, 2007, ii. 
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In contrast to this extreme prediction, another school of thought presents a bit 
more moderate explanation, which considers this a necessity for current Chinese political 
leadership to gain the military’s support to keep the existing political set-up unchanged.            
As far as the economic sphere is concerned, it is believed that China is benefiting 
because of a trade imbalance with other states and by resorting to unfair trade practices 
that include protectionism and subsidies offered to local Chinese industries by the 
Chinese government. It is also believed that China may use this trade surplus to buy the 
industries of other countries, and such “things came to a head in 2005 when China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation’s attempt to buy Unocal Corp. was stopped by 
opposition from U.S. lawmakers.”37 What is worrisome for China is that all such 
perceptions are gradually transforming into government policies and forcing China to cut 
all such practices. In 2007, the United States imposed countervailing duties on some 
Chinese paper imports and filed complaints thrice against China at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).38 
Nicholas Lardyo, China expert at the Brookings Institution, proposed that “the 
pace of China’s industrial development and trade expansion is unparalleled in modern 
economic history.”39 He further said, “while this has led to unprecedented improvement 
in Chinese incomes and living standards it also poses challenges for other countries.”40 
Some believe that this economic challenge of China will simultaneously enhance military 
threat as well. In this context, Denny Roy argues that  
A stronger, wealthier China would have greater wherewithal to increase its 
arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs and to increase their lethality through 
improvements in range, accuracy, and survivability. If China continues its 
                                                 
37 James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in 
Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 656. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Evelyn Iritani and Maria Dickerson, “People's Republic of Products,” Los Angeles Times, October 
20, 2002, www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-chinalocts2t0o.ry. 
40  Ibid. 
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rate of economic expansion, absolute growth in Chinese nuclear 
capabilities should be expected to increase.41  
Figure 1 shows the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) growth and defense 
budget growth over the years. 




In the ideological sphere, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is considered to be an alternate 
to the ‘Washington Consensus,’ a Chinese developmental model where economic 
liberalization can succeed without political liberalization. This model is quite impressive 
to authoritative regimes or states with human rights issues. China has been providing all 
types of aid and assistance without demanding any improvements in that state’s political 
setup, quite contrary to the conditions imposed by the United States or European 
countries before rendering any economic aid.  
Though few scholars have views opposite to this perception, they only consider 
China as a strategic competitor and not as a threat. As Khalid has concluded in his study 
on the issue, “…the view of an all-menacing China is often exaggerated by academics, 
pundits, and politicians; this hype is as misleading as it is counterproductive to 
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understand the nature of the threat and craft sound policies to deal with it.”43 The 
question of whether China is a threat to global security or to economic gains of other 
countries, or otherwise, depends upon the school of thought to which those scholars 
belong or the political inclination of the policy makers of the states. Neorealists believe in 
China being a threat, whereas neoliberalists consider China as a competitor. This section 
considers neorealist opinions as the foundation of ‘China’s threat theory’ to analyze the 
claims and predictions made by these scholars in light of present and projected 
capabilities of China in each sphere. Fundamentally, however, the debate would center on 
China’s capabilities and intentions to see what challenges are there for Chinese soft 
power.  
A. SCHOLARS’ AND POLICY MAKERS’ PREDICTIONS 
Based on the analysis of China’s international behavior patterns, many scholars 
have concluded their assessment of China to be most likely a status-quo hegemon. 
Alastair Iain Johnston provides such insight: After studying China’s multilateral 
involvement with foreign organizations and its own preference to recognize international 
and regional models, he has determined that China is not seeking revision of the status 
quo.44 In the same way, Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, who based his analysis of China’s 
capabilities and uncertainties in both military and economic spheres, did not consider 
China as a threat to U.S. security or the international system.45 Nevertheless, scholars 
who concede to offensive realism contend that China, like all great powers of the past, is 
revisionist and there can be no exception to it. 
Neorealists claim the international system to be anarchical, where a state’s 
ultimate objective is its own security. For defensive neorealists, states have every 
enticement to achieve their security by maintaining the existing balance of power. And to 
maintain the current distribution of power and face external threats, alliances are 
                                                 
43 Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis,” Asian 
Perspective 31, no. 3 (2007): 41–66. 
44 Ian Alastair Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security 27,  no. 4 (Spring 
2003): 5–56. 
45 Al-Rodhan, “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis,” 41–66. 
 15 
formed.46 This in turn transforms the state’s foreign policy, which is not only interest-
based but also more cautious in its interaction with other states.  
On the other hand, offensive realists do not see any room for status-quo powers in 
the international system. They argue that states, rather than forming partnership 
agreements, are more likely to seek measures that augment their share of power in 
relation to other states. And this increase of power is at the cost of competing state actors. 
John Mearsheimer extends on this: “A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the 
system.”47 He considers the attainment of global hegemony to be impossible. A great 
power should not only be able to dominate its region, but should also not let other powers 
dominate other regions.48 Offensive realists consider China’s buildup of its military and 
economic power to replace Russian and Japanese dominance of the region. Mearsheimer 
predicted the China threat as follows:  
It is clear that the most dangerous scenario the United States might face in 
the early twenty-first century is one in which China becomes a potential 
hegemon in Northeast Asia. Of course, China’s prospects of becoming a 
potential hegemon depend largely on whether its economy continues 
modernizing at a rapid pace. If that happens, and China becomes not only 
a leading producer of cutting-edge technologies, but the world’s wealthiest 
great power, it would almost certainly use its wealth to build a mighty 
military machine. Moreover, for sound strategic reasons, it would surely 
pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the Western 
Hemisphere during the nineteenth century.49 
Advocates of the “China threat” debate consider the peaceful rise of China as 
implausible and view a super power China as a threat to the existing system. The western 
world views China’s rise with anxiousness and uncertainty. Its military modernization, 
rapid economic growth, and increasing energy demand has agitated many minds to talk 
about the “China threat.” Richard Bernstein and Ross Murrow view China as pursuing 
hegemonic ambitions, stating that “driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem 
the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking 
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to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.”50 All the scholars have used 
various theories to support their predictions. Robert Kagan in light of empirical evidence 
has asserted: “The history of rising powers ... and their attempted ‘management’ by 
established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising 
powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to 
reflect new realities of power.”51 Kagan goes further by saying that China, “like all rising 
powers of the past, including the United States, wants to reshape the international system 
to suit its own purpose.”52 
Kenneth Waltz predicted that “China will emerge as a great power even without 
trying very hard so long as it remains politically united and competent.”53 Various 
scholars and policy makers have not only rejected the concept of “peaceful rise,” but 
have also suggested various strategies for “containing” China.54  Bill Gertz suggested to 
take the China issue seriously by arguing that  
The People’s Republic of China is the most serious national security threat 
the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable 
future ... The reason Americans should take the threat from China so 
seriously is that it puts at risk the very national existence of the United 
States.55 
Though U.S. policy has been to consolidate China into the existing global 
financial and political system,56 proponents of “China threat” claim that irrespective of 
how much integrated China is in international system, it remains a revisionist power and 
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it will ultimately seek hegemony in the region. Condoleezza Rice argued the same point 
in the following manner: 
Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China 
is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military 
power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that 
condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is 
a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning 
Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a ‘status 
quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its 
own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic 
partner’ the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China’s 
record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of 
ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China 
will do what it can to enhance its position, whether by stealing nuclear 
secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.57 
Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick stated that “many Americans 
worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of 
anxiety about China.”58 In fact, China is following the same Monroe Doctrine (1823) of 
the United States when it comes to East Asia, and its desires to shape and influence East 
Asia are similar to that of the United States. Brzezinski and Mearshimer ask “why should 
we expect China to act differently than the United States?”59 And Waldron concludes 
that “sooner or later, if present trends continue without change, war is probable in 
Asia.”60 In the security realm of the states, the discussion of intentions and capabilities 
has always been point of debate. As Thomas J. Christensen notes,  
Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the 
most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment 
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of China’s overall future military power compared with that of the United 
States and other East Asian regional powers.”61  
B. MILITARY THREAT 
Now, in light of the above discussion, succeeding paragraphs analyze the China 
threat debate in light of its current capabilities and whether all these claims translate into 
China as a future threat to global security and the economic world or otherwise. 
 Military Spending 1.
It has been the general perception of China analysts since the fall of the Soviets 
that China’s build-up and modernization of its military is to seek hegemony in the 
system. These claims are supported by three arguments: China’s defense budget is 
considered to be actually higher than what is shown in official documents; China’s 
enhanced military capabilities enable it to project power for globally-oriented objectives; 
China’s military modernization is underway despite the fact that it does not face any 
external threats at the time.62  
As per the U.S. Secretary of Defense, “analysis of data from 2005 through 2014 
indicates China’s officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent 
per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period.”63 Figure 2 shows the military 
expenditure trend of various states including China. 
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 Military Expenditure Data by Country, 1978–201264 Figure 2.
 
 
Bernstein and Munro contend China’s actual expenditure on military outfits is ten 
times greater than what the government actually advertises.65 However; the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense assessment is significantly less. For example, its estimates find 
China’s actual military spending for 2014 to be $165 billion as compared to the $136 
billion announced military spending by the Chinese government.66 Still, if we compare 
China’s military spending with other states, Chinese military spending would seem quite 
moderate.  
 Military Capabilities 2.
It can also be argued that “military spending can be seen as an indication of 
intentions, but not actual capabilities, as military capabilities require far more than 
spending.”67 The data in Figure 2 reflects that China’s military spending is moderate, but 
still one cannot negate the hegemonic intentions of China or otherwise. It is again quite 
difficult to measure the exact capabilities vis-à-vis its offensive or defensive nature. In 
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succeeding paragraphs, China’s military modernization are discussed, as these are 
considered a better indicator of its future capabilities.      
 Naval Modernization a.
China has made quite significant improvements in modernizing its ground forces, 
but still cannot be on par with the United States when it comes to naval domination in 
East Asia. China is also facing intelligence and logistical problems in extending its reach 
in the Indian Ocean. China’s naval modernization, which started in the 1990s, is a broad-
based effort that includes “a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs” 
and “improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education 
and training, and exercises.”68 
Proponents see China as a possible threat vis-a-vis its naval modernization 
scheme, as it is perceived as a challenge to the U.S. naval establishment in East Asia and 
also reflects a desire to compete against India within the Indian Ocean region. Indians 
also believe that Chinese modernization of the last two decades has created force 
imbalance between India and China. In addition to this balance of forces tilting toward 
China, “the deployment of new naval systems with force projection capabilities and 
modernization of missiles with greater precision and mobility would further limit India’s 
options.”69  
According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, “the PLA Navy’s 
goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional force that is able to project 
power across the greater Asia-Pacific region for high-intensity operations over a period of 
several months.”70 To achieve this, China is likely to establish several access points until 
2025 to overcome its logistical issues in the Indian Ocean. These access points, which the 
Chinese regard as economic staging points, are worrisome for Indians who believe they 
                                                 
68 O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and 
Issues for Congress," 5–6. 
69 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagoplan, “India’s Perceptions and Responses to the Growth of Chinese Power,” 
in China’s Power and Asian Security, ed. Mingjiang Li and Kalyan M. Kemburi (New York, Routledge, 
2014), 144.  
70 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, 41. 
 21 
are encircled by the Chinese through this “String of Pearls.” Rajeswari has quoted the 
same fears expressed in a classified Indian document prepared by the Integrated Defense 
Staff of the Ministry of Defense, which considers these access points as “facilities that 
can be upgraded to naval bases,” and Gwadar Port would “facilitate enormous command 
and control capability for prospective Chinese presence in the IOR.”71 For the time 
being,  
Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is 
to field a force that can succeed in a short duration conflict with Taiwan 
and act as an anti-access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the 
arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a 
conflict.72  
The Secretary of Defense states that “the PLA Navy now possesses the largest number of 
vessels in Asia, with more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and 
patrol craft,”73 and that “the PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, 
submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia.”74 Sustainability, however, will 
remain the problem for the Chinese Navy in the near future, especially in the Indian 
Ocean, where  
China can at best hope to ‘show the flag’ for coercive and/or defensive 
purposes in those waters until after 2015. Nor would it apply to the blue 
water of the Western Pacific, particularly if opposed by U.S. or allied 
naval forces.75 
 Nuclear Weapons b.
China’s nuclear weapons modernization program involves not only an increase in 
its stockpile of nuclear weapons and upgrade of its nuclear-capable land-, sea-, and air-
based delivery systems. As of 2013, it was estimated that China had approximately 250 
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nuclear warheads in its arsenal, which is increasing at a slow rate.76 Out of these, nearly 
150, with mainly short and medium ranges, are estimated to be delivered by “land-based 
ballistic missiles, aircraft, and an emerging ballistic submarine fleet.”77 Meanwhile, the 
number of long-range missiles is steadily declining. Per predictions of the U.S. 
intelligence community, “by the mid-2020s, China could more than double the number of 
warheads on missiles that are capable of threatening the United States to well over 
100.”78 “The capability of the arsenal is also increasing, with liquid-fuel and relatively 
inaccurate maneuverable missiles being replaced by solid-fuel and more accurate road-
mobile missiles.”79 As per an Federation of American Scientists [FAS] study analysis,  
Although the United States has maintained extensive nuclear strike plans 
against Chinese targets for more than a half century, China has never 
responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do 
so in the future. As a result, Chinese nuclear weapons are quantitatively 
and qualitatively much inferior to their U.S. counterparts...”80  
One of the reasons for such constraint could be Chinese concerns about  
the survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent, and it spends 
considerable resources on dispersing and hiding its land-based missiles. 
This makes its submarine program puzzling, for it is much riskier to 
deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by 
unfriendly forces, than to deploy them on land.81 
 Technological Advancement c.
It is important to note that the military power expressed in terms of numbers 
without quality can only give a false sense of security or threat to nations. As Nye argued, 
military power is “the ability to collect, process, and disseminate and integrate complex 
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systems of space-based surveillance, high speed computers, and ‘smart’ weapons.”82 As 
the revolution in military affairs is transforming almost all the modern armies of the 
world, China is no exception. China is acquiring such technologies mainly through 
leveraging dual-use technologies. As per the U.S. Secretary of Defense,  China has been 
making marked improvements to its homegrown technology and industrial sectors. 
However, the state “continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western 
dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how.”83 These purchases have 
resulted in the merging of partnerships and agreements ending in joint ventures with 
other countries, particularly the West.84  
C. ECONOMIC THREAT 
China’s military modernization is no doubt linked with its unprecedented 
economic growth. China’s economy is estimated to have grown at approximately 9 
percent per year during last two decades, which has tripled its GNP.85 A Pew survey 
conducted in 2005 found that “66 percent of Americans perceived China to [pose] a 
serious threat to jobs in their country … while 54 percent are concerned over the level of 
Chinese investment in their country.”86 The same are the concerns of the respondents of 
other modernized states. In a 2006 BBC survey, “79 percent of Britain’s public viewed 
China as the leading threat to their nation’s economy.”87 
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 China’s Violations of Intellectual Property 1.
It is estimated that U.S. industries have suffered a loss of approximately $2 billion 
per year as China continuously violates intellectual property rights.88 Though most 
observers do not consider China to be the only violator, some claim the Chinese 
government to be the biggest violator and that China is not only benefitting from it 
economically, but militarily as well.89 China remains under scrutiny on this issue, but it is 
also believed to be only a sign of various other aspects of economic competition between 
the United States and China.90 On the whole, Chinese enterprises produce goods and 
services that were initially developed outside of China. The most successful of these are 
companies that are providing global production assemblage of technology of foreign 
manufacturers.91 In fact, most of the added value with regard to technology exports 
originates outside of China; “over 85% of these exports are produced in either joint 
ventures or wholly owned foreign subsidies of multinationals based in advanced capitalist 
countries.”92  
In order to counter this trend, Chinese leaders are promoting ‘indigenous 
innovation.’ Distinct technical benchmarks in the information technology sector serve as 
the centerpiece of their agenda. It is their desire that, given China’s share of the 
international market, other nations will commit to these standards. However, so far, this 
effort has been mostly unsuccessful.93 Relatedly, China has also expressed commitments 
in spurring scientific innovation. This intent is reflected in the state’s research and 
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development budget, which increased from 1.75 percent to 2.2 percent in 2015. This 
increase has led China to become the world’s second largest contributor of research and 
development. This has positioned China to become a leading contributor in idea 
generation.  
 China’s Cheap Labor: Outsourcing and Loss of Jobs 2.
Outsourcing to China is a permanent political debate not only in the United States, 
but in the Western world as well. Many multinational companies that wanted to benefit 
from the lower labor costs offered by the Chinese outsourced their industries to China.94 
“In 2009, 153 of the largest 200 exporters in China were firms with a foreign stake.”95 
The belief that China is stealing the foreign direct investment (FDI) of the United States 
or some other country is also not correct, but these countries are losing business to others. 
Still, as compared to the United States’ erratic incremental growth, China has been quite 
constant in this regard. During 2014, China’s share of global FDI reached up to nearly 
$128 billion as compared to $123.9 billion in 2013, “while investments in the United 
States fell to $86 billion from $230.8 billion.”96 This is demonstrated in Figure 3. 
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 FDI Comparison: United States and China97 Figure 3.
 
 
That meant the loss of industrial and manufacturing jobs of outsourcing states to 
all cheap labor countries. But China is not alone in this regard. Many developing nations 
offer the same comparative advantage of cheap labor to attract multinational 
companies.98 As Kelly mentioned the numbers of the United Nations (UN) report of 
2014, according to which Asian developing countries achieved 15% rise in foreign 
investment to an all-time high of $492 billion. While India achieved an exceptional 
increase of 26% to $35 billion in FDI.99  
Fear has also been expressed by scholars and policy makers of Southeast Asia 
about losing economic prospects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) nations to the sustained expansion of the Chinese economy. The most 
prominent discussion point of all the expressed fear is the diversion of FDI to China. 
Wong and Chan’s analysis finds a correlation between the rise in FDI to China and the 
decrease in Southeast Asia and concludes that “much of regional FDI [has been] diverted 
from ASEAN in favor of China.”100 Same is the belief in the United States that 
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Americans are losing their jobs due to China’s cheap labor.101 The increase in the 
manufacturing workforce of China since 2002 is not only more than the entire 
manufacturing workforce of the United States, but is also more than double the workforce 
of what the United States lost during the same period.102 This can be seen in Figure 4. 
 Comparison of Manufacturing Employment in the United States Figure 4.




However, with China’s “currency revaluation and an increase in the minimum 
wage,”104 this advantage of cheap labor will not last long. Such government policies in 
China are likely to minimize the benefits to manufacturers and investors in China, and 
they will be forced to look for other venues to invest their money.  
                                                 
101 Ben Miller, “If Manufacturing Employment is Dead Then Take a Look at China’s Zombie 
Apocalypse,” The Innovation Files, April 23, 2014, www.innovationfiles.org/china-manufacturing-
employment/.    
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Stock Whiz, “China's Competitive Edge: Beyond Cheap Labor - Part 1.” 
 28 
 Trade Deficit 3.
China had been the largest creditor to the United States for several years. During 
all these years, the trade deficit between the United States and China kept growing in 
favor of China. As per the data of U.S. Census Bureau, China reached a trade surplus of 
$343 billion by the end of 2014, as compared to $1.66 billion in 1986.105 It should also 
be noted that China has only contributed to one-third of the total growth of the U.S. trade 
deficit over the years, while the total trade deficit of the United States reflects further 
imbalances with many other nations.106   
 China-U.S. Trade107 Figure 5.
 
 
China’s foreign reserves grew from $2.3 billion to $3.8 trillion from 1977 to 
2014.108 Some argue that if China decides to dump its reserves, that will put the United 
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States in a vulnerable position. On the contrary, another argument suggests that this 
action of China could also cause the collapse of its own economy.109 Foreign reserves are 
now part of a healthy Chinese economy, and China would not be that irrational to 
liquidate its holdings.  
 China’s Manipulation of Its Currency 4.
China has undervalued the Yuan, its form of currency, since the 1990s. Analysts 
have not agreed on the extent of this undervaluation, which has been widely believed to 
be at least 20 percent.110 This kept Chinese goods prices quite lower than its competitors 
and led to more exports, especially to the United States. Faced with pressure from the 
United States and other competing economies, China has ultimately “revalued the yuan 
by approximately 2.1 percent.”111 
D. IDEOLOGICAL THREAT 
Though, broad liberalization by Beijing during the last few decades, being in line 
with the conventional explanations for economic development, deserves the credit. But 
still there are a few scholars who are of the view that just as significant as liberalization 
are the distinct structural reforms that the state has overseen, which have enabled China 
to reform economically, but not politically.112 This model is quite attractive to developing 
countries, especially to those regimes who do not wish to have political liberalization in 
their states. But Ding points out in his study, as shown in Table 1, that the Chinese model 
is attractive to all developing countries, irrespective of regime type.113 
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Table 1.   Countries Showing Interest in “Beijing Consensus”114 
Region  Countries Regime type 
East/Southeast Asia N. Korea, Vietnam, Laos Communist 




South Asia India Liberal democracy 
Middle East Iran Authoritarian 
Latin America Brazil Liberal democracy 
Africa Zimbabwe Authoritarian 
 
China has been very active in using macro and micro economic policy to shape 
their economy. Some of these practices have been borrowed from their neighbors. The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), just like Singapore, is trying to have a free market 
economy while still exercising an authoritarian government.115 “Joshua Cooper Ramo 
labels what he sees as China’s unique approach as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ (BC, beijing 
gongshi), thereby distinguishing it from the ‘Washington Consensus’ (WC, huashengdun 
gongshi), which connotes a more conventional development approach.”116 But mostly it 
is referred as the ‘China Model.’ “Interpretations of the China Model vary far and wide, 
and none stand up well as a rigorous summary of a distinctive Chinese developmental 
experience.”117 What has become evident is China distinguishing itself as a gradual 
reform state, rather than adopting the ‘shock therapy’ approach that has been linked to 
central Europe.118 In this sense, China’s state structure is “socialist with Chinese 
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characteristics.”119 In essence, China has maintained an economic growth program while 
maintaining its original political institutions.120 
E. SURGE IN ENERGY DEMAND 
China aims at increasing its GDP four times from 2000 to 2020. The major hurdle 
for China in achieving its objective is required energy. China’s “energy demand has taken 
front stage in considering China’s mercantilist measures.”121 For example, the state’s rate 
of oil consumption has grown four times between 1985 and 2005, while this speed of 
growth is expected to stay constant over the next twenty years.122  Currently, 40 percent 
of China’s oil demand is met through imports, which is likely to increase with a decline 
in its domestic supply. This is demonstrated in Figure 6.  
 China’s Oil Production and Demand123 Figure 6.
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Population growth and resource consumption go hand-in-hand. BBC business 
reporter Richard Anderson highlighted in “Resource Depletion: Opportunity or Looming 
Catastrophe?” that “while demand for resources from an exploding and wealthier 
population soars, finding and extracting new sources of supply is becoming increasingly 
difficult and expensive.”124 Michael Klare, a Five College Consortium professor, said, 
“the world needs more oil and gas than ever before, and an ever-increasing share of this 
energy is likely to be derived from offshore reservoirs.”125 BBC editor, Peter Goodchild 
explains, “to maintain industrial society, the production of steel cannot be curtailed: there 
are no ‘green’ materials for the construction of skyscrapers, large bridges, automobiles, 
machinery, or tools.”126 
China’s steel production is nearly seven times that of the United States, the 
world’s number two producer. Moreover, China’s production exceeds the rest of the 
world production combined. The United States is the number one steel importer, with 
China ranking seventh. The fact that China is the largest producer and the seventh largest 
importer provides strong evidence that China cannot keep pace with its population 
growth.127Additionally, the Chinese are using steel to build naval ships and submarines at 
a faster pace than any other nation in the world, including the U.S.128 Admiral Locklear 
reinforced this fact to the House Appropriations Committee, saying, “China continues an 
aggressive ship building program to produce and field advanced frigates, destroyers, and 
the first in-class cruiser-sized warship.”129 For the first time since World War II, a naval 
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power is emerging, measured by ship quantity and quality equal to the U.S., provided that 
the Chinese continue to devote resources and maintain their political will. 
China’s zealous dispute over the resource-abundant Spratly Islands, Scarborough 
Shoal, and Paracel Islands is further evidence of their resource dependency. For decades, 
the Chinese did little to enforce their “claimed” territorial borders. However, recently, the 
Chinese have been constructing islands from shallow reefs, which they regard as 
sovereign territory that carries with it 200 miles of Economic Exclusion Zone rights.130 
These previously underwater reefs are capable of landing airplanes, drilling for oil, and 
pumping natural gas.131 The Philippines, Vietnamese, and Taiwanese governments have 
all voiced complaints to the United Nations regarding China’s aggressive behavior. 
Disregarding numbers, the primary concern is China’s swelling oil consumption, 
which may result in a resource war between the United States and China over access to 
energy sources. If China on one hand started developing key alliances with resource- 
wealthy countries throughout the globe, it has also evolved grand strategies to meet 
resource scarcity through alternative energies and conservation.132 However, because 
China and all other industrialized countries need energy to fuel their economies, 
competition over energy resources will always remain. 
After having discussed China’s rise and its implication on global peace in light of 
various arguments presented by international scholars and policy makers, next chapter 
will cover Chinese efforts in refuting all such apprehensions and Chinese endeavors to 
convince the world of its peaceful rise by utilizing its soft power. Chapter IV will first 
present Chinese discourse on the concept of soft power as compared to western concept 
already discussed in chapter II. Then I will briefly discuss the objectives of Chinese soft 
power, and finally the resources utilized to achieve those objectives.  
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IV. CHINA’S DISCOURSE ON SOFT POWER 
A. SOFT POWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
China’s exercise of hard power during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996 and 
Mischief Island incident brought setbacks to the Chinese image in the world. Just a year 
or two later, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, while Western nations were slow to 
react to the crisis, Beijing’s timely decision not to devalue its currency was perceived as 
standing up for Asia. This is the time experts consider as the moment when Chinese soft 
power began to emerge.133 Beijing recognized the efficacy of using soft power. Instead 
of resorting to military action, China started using a less confrontational approach to 
resolve its issues with other states. China’s effort of proclaiming itself as leader within 
the developing world during the Bandung Conference is a strategy “Beijing is reasserting 
today.”134 The signing of a code of conduct over the disputed boundaries in the South 
China Sea in 2002, and agreement to establish a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area within a 
decade are examples of it.135 The world has become more concerned with rising Chinese 
soft power. Few consider it competing with the United States’ concept of soft power and 
even have pointed towards the “rise of Chinese soft power and decline of American soft 
power.”136  
Despite the fact there is intense debate among Chinese scholars about ‘soft 
power,’ “China has yet to develop a comprehensive, coherent, national soft-power 
strategy although there are disparate policies toward this end.”137 China’s policy of 
utilizing soft power is as of yet ad hoc. Contrary to Kurlantzick’s declaration of Chinese 
soft power as a ‘charm offensive,’ Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy consider it to 
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be more reactive to counter China’s threat perception.138 In their view Chinese leaders do 
not want to initiate competition with the West and the United States by promoting 
“socialist values as an alternative to Western values,” but they still see this possibility in 
the future once China is more powerful and has a bigger role at the global level.139 At 
present, China just wants to present its softer image by promoting Chinese culture. As per 
Glaser and Murphy: 
The mainstream intellectual view is that culture is the core resource of a 
state’s power. This view has been embraced by China’s leadership, 
resulting in expanded funding for the development of China’s cultural 
soft-power resources at home and its expansion abroad.”140  
Despite the fact that China is making progress in softening its image by 
benefitting from many opportunities, it still has to overcome significant challenges it 
faces in terms of its public diplomacy. The same principle of centralism that is the base of 
China’s authoritarian regime is found missing in Chinese diplomacy. The Chinese 
diplomatic system is quite complicated, where responsibilities are divided among many 
departments and groups. There are separate ministries and departments without any 
central controlling authority to look into different aspects of public diplomacy, such as 
cultural diplomacy, media diplomacy, and public diplomacy with other socialist 
countries.141 While every department recognizes the significance of public diplomacy, 
individual segments follow their own path with no central authority. As a historically 
strong state with a weak society, China has not been successful in utilizing the resources 
of transnational agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement a 
coherent policy towards public diplomacy.142 
In China, public diplomacy, which was an unacquainted concept, has become 
quite popular among Chinese scholars over the past few years. Students are choosing it as 
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their thesis topic and Chinese newspapers are writing about it quite frequently.143 The 
Chinese normally use the term “dui wai xuan chuan or wai xuan (external 
propaganda)”144 to advertise Chinese achievements and improve its image overseas. 
Unlike its English meaning of the term, in Chinese, xuan chuan (propaganda) has 
progressive implications correlated with all the actions that support it.145 Xuan chuan has 
two further sub-categories: “nei xuan (internal propaganda) and wai xuan (external 
propaganda).”146 Though Beijing is quite successful in nei xuan (internal propaganda), it 
is quite weak in wai xuan (external propaganda) or public diplomacy, and the reason for 
this is the mixing of external and internal propaganda by the Chinese government. 
On March 19, 2004, during the inaugural address of the new Division for Public 
Diplomacy under the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese 
Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang elaborated the goal of public diplomacy by 
saying, “the basic goal of public diplomacy is to enhance the exchanges and interaction 
with the public in order to guide and win the understanding and support of the public for 
foreign policies.”147 Foreign Minister Zhaoxing Li added to this by saying, “we have 
actively conducted public diplomacy by publicizing China’s foreign policies and 
activities to the Chinese public, thus winning their understanding and support.”148 This 
reflects that when they say “public,” it means “Chinese public,” and public diplomacy for 
them is what Americans call “public affairs.” This is because of what the Chinese 
government has always believed, that “foreign policy must be an extension of domestic 
policy and that diplomacy should serve domestic politics.”149    
At the same time, the Chinese believe in “minjian waijiao (people-to people 
diplomacy),” and the Chinese, just like the French, rely on cultural diplomacy more, 
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rather than emphasizing the use of media like the United States.150 The reason for this is 
non-integration of Chinese media at global level, whereas Chinese culture is highly 
developed. “Landmarks in recent exchange and cultural diplomacy have included the 
Chinese-French Cultural Year in 2004, the Chinese-Russian National Year in 2005, and 
the Chinese-Indian Friend Year in 2006.”151  China’s promotion of culture is a vital 
element of their public diplomacy tactic. Joshua Kurlantzick offers a different perspective 
on soft power while relating it to China:  
In the context of China, both the Chinese government and many nations 
influenced by China enunciate a broader idea of soft power than did Nye. 
For the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and 
security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy 
but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and 
investment and participation in multilateral organizations that are Nye’s 
carrots and sticks.152  
Kurlantzick further explains that authoritarian regimes seeking to remain in power may 
find Beijing’s level of assistance and investment attractive, while it is democratic states 
that are attracted to the ability of soft power to generate support of the public.153  
Realizing the importance of the level of education of bureaucrats in the 
formulation of sound policies, the Chinese government has laid quite an emphasis on 
raising the education standards of these officials. It’s not only the senior officials, but 
midlevel bureaucrats, too, who have sought higher education. “In 1982 only 20 percent of 
China’s provincial leaders had attended college. In 2002, this number was 98 
percent…and those under 54, two-thirds hold Masters or PhD degrees.”154 Though 
Beijing is putting in efforts in educating its diplomats, the bureaucratic system needs 
reforms. Chinese diplomats are considered to be overcautious. One foreign observer 
commented,  
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The recent SARS and Avian Flu epidemics reveal that public diplomacy is 
essentially reactive rather than pro-active; defensive; secretive; potentially 
dishonest; and, for purely political expediency, too cautious and slow in 
responding to crises that have increasingly already been reported in the 
foreign media.155  
Additionally, the Bureau of Policy Planning that has been created by China has 
centered on a long-term vision, and strategies such as the ‘charm offensive’ have thus 
been developed.156 The Publicity Department, established after the end of the Cold War, 
seeks five main objectives, “publicizing China’s assertions to the outside world, forming 
a desirable image of the state, issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China, 
improving the international environment surrounding China, and exerting influence on 
the policy decisions of foreign countries.”157 
B. CHINA’S SOFT POWER: OBJECTIVES 
 Indicator of Major Power Status 1.
The strategic circles of China firmly believe that a state’s status is determined by 
its ability to project its soft power coupled with its hard power to “maintain advantageous 
position in international competition.”158 One cannot separate soft power from China’s 
rise, as any world power must present an attractive culture and social values to the 
publics of other countries. As Luo Jianbo has argued,  “if a major power cannot provide 
some guiding moral or cultural ideals of universal value for the international society, its 
major power status is unlikely to be acknowledged by other states, and even its own 
development is hard to be sustained.”159 So if China desires to rise to the major power 
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status and wishes to get recognition from the world community as well, then China must 
present attractive values to the world that are acceptable to all societies of the world.  
If one group of Chinese scholars considers soft power projection aimed towards 
the international community to get the recognition of great power status, another school 
of thought, which is in line with Hu-Wen leadership, wants soft power to create favorable 
domestic environments to gain a peaceful rise through ‘harmonious society.’160  In their 
view, China has to tackle with domestic challenges first to achieve stability through 
“more attention to culture, national cohesion, morality and institutions.”161  
 Repudiating “China Threat Theory” 2.
The primary objective of Chinese soft power is to rebut the “China threat” 
perception and sway the international community to accept the peaceful rise of China.162 
To that end, as President Hu Jintao mentioned during a meeting with Chinese diplomats 
that China has to shape the perception of the world in China’s favor during an “important 
period of strategic opportunity,” China should endeavor to ensure four “environments”: 
“a peaceful and stable international environment; a neighbourly and friendly environment 
in surrounding regions; a cooperative environment based on equality and mutual benefits; 
and an objective and friendly media environment.”163 This externally focused soft power 
will keep the neighborhood of China peaceful and would not allow the tensions to 
escalate. The Chinese policy makers are aware of the fact that their building of hard 
power—military and economic—has to be in sync with its perception in the world. 
Otherwise, if other states are going to feel threatened by China’s rise, they may balance 
against China to prohibit its expansion of hard power.   
 Keeping Up with the Soft Power Race 3.
Just like many international strategists, Chinese also acknowledges that the role 
military power alone used to play in achieving national objectives is not that highly 
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regarded in the current international environment. In the words of Zhang Jianjing, a 
Chinese analyst, “the competition among nation states appears to be a rivalry of hard 
power, but behind such rivalry is the competition between institutions, civilizations, and 
strategies, which are essentially the rivalry of soft power.”164 International competition is 
governed by new rules, and multidimensional approaches have appeared to play a 
significant role in this power-seeking game. China is faced with the same challenge of 
competing for soft power with other major powers in the long term. Every major state 
like the United States, India, Japan, and European countries have intensified their soft 
power efforts. In this bazaar of goodwill perception, every country is marketing to 
promote its own brand. China does not want to lag behind in this race.  
The Chinese are also worried about the way American culture is making headway 
in the younger Chinese generation. The same fear was sounded in an essay by Hu Jintao, 
China’s president, when he warned the Chinese community by saying, “We must clearly 
see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernizing and 
dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long term 
infiltration.” He added that “the international culture of the West is strong while we are 
weak.”165 The infiltration of liberal political ideology in Chinese society is also making 
the Chinese political elite fearful, an ideology that may endanger the legitimacy of their 
government. To limit the damage, “Beijing has also raised defenses. It limits foreign 
films to only 20 per year, subsidizes Chinese companies creating cultural products, and 
has restricted Chinese television shows that are imitations of Western entertainment 
programs.”166 As Li Haijuan has suggested, “The competition of cultural power is the 
core of soft power contention.”167 So China not only has to counter the influence of soft 
power of other countries externally, but they have to work hard internally to achieve a 
‘harmonious society.’  
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C. CHINA’S MECHANISM OF SOFT POWER 
 Culture 1.
 Culture: As a Source of Soft Power a.
Levels of attractiveness produced by different traits of one state’s culture are 
different from other states.168 What is considered attractive in one country may attract 
people of another country or specific segments of society. “Culture is the set of values 
and practices that create meaning for a society.”169 Generally, culture is divided as high 
culture and popular culture. If high culture appeals to the elites of society, popular culture 
attracts the general public.170  High culture relates to areas such as literature, art, and 
education.171 Most would regard high culture to be more productive with respect to its 
contribution in soft power.172 Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “I can think of no 
more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have 
been educated here.”173 
Critics regard popular culture as having little political effect and being crude 
commercialism, and consider it as mass entertainment.174 The poet Carl Sandburg stated, 
“What, Hollywood’s more important than Harvard? The answer is, not as clean as 
Harvard, but nevertheless, further reaching.”175 Popular culture has more reach and easy 
access than higher culture, just like the movies and other forms of mass entertainment, 
and can spread more ideas than forms of higher culture. By expressing and supporting 
universal values that others desire, a state becomes more legitimate in the eyes of its 
audience.  
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 Confucianism: Base of Chinese Culture b.
Chinese civilization is the primary basis of China’s soft power, which enables 
China to inform a new identity that is based on Asian values. In constructivists’ 
understanding, the historical past carries significant value in forming the new identity of 
the present to be used as a narrative to motivate the people.176 Chinese civilization, which 
has a history of several thousand years, is shared by neighboring countries and also 
influenced few during that long interaction, and therefore has all the potential to call upon 
common interests among the same neighbors. If we understand this aspect, it is only then 
that we truly can determine the importance of Chinese culture with regard to China’s soft 
power. Thus, the history of China and formation of its civilization are important notions, 
as they cannot be changed. These elements are instrumental in creating an “imagined” 
Asian identity and values.177 
Though there are many attributes of Chinese civilization, Confucianism is a core 
factor that presents a different perspective of Chinese values and vision from that of the 
West. East Asian countries are well familiar with Confucianism, and it carries universal 
meaning in this region, just like human rights or the notion of democracy in the West. In 
fact, a cause of the East Asian economic miracle is considered to be the same 
Confucianism, and the present rise of China has again brought it into the limelight, 
enabling individuals the ability to carry out Asian values that are inherent to their 
identity. 
Since the Jiang Zemin era, various efforts have been made to introduce 
Confucianism as a major ideology in place of socialist ideas. For example, ‘Outline of 
Implementation of National Morality (Guomin daode shishi gangyao),’ enacted by China 
in 2001, merges Confucian morals with socialist collectivism.178 These attempts were 
broadened even more in the Hu Jintao era. “From the Confucian version of democracy 
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(minben zhuyi), elements have been drawn and recast in terms such as ‘considering 
people as fundamental’, ‘close to the people’, ‘harmonious society’, and a ‘socialist view 
of honor and disgrace.’”179 China’s diplomatic ideas also include Confucius beliefs. 
“Diplomatic principles such as ‘live peacefully with neighbors, bring prosperity to them, 
and provide safety to them’ and a ‘harmonious world’ are all taken from 
Confucianism.”180 China plans to reestablish Confucianism quite systematically as an 
inherently Chinese civilization and vision.  
 Confucius Institutes c.
President Hu Jintao, during his address to the Australian Parliament on October 
24, 2003, announced that “Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese but also the 
whole world…We stand ready to step up cultural exchanges with the rest of the world in 
a joint promotion of cultural prosperity.”181 To provide Chinese language and cultural 
resources, the Chinese Ministry of Education has set up 480 Confucius Institutes around 
the world.182 The character of each institute is unique in its own way, but the main 
mission is “promoting Chinese language and culture and supporting local Chinese 
[language] teaching.”183 These Confucius Institutes have three main objectives:  “to teach 
Chinese, to promote cultural exchange, and to facilitate business activity.”184 
One of the duties of the Confucius Institutes is “to accept both supervision from 
and assessments made by the headquarters.”185 Furthermore, any overseas university that 
wishes to have a Confucius Institute must “accept Confucius Institutes’ operation model 
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and teaching model and be able to accept the oversight, evaluation and certification by 
the Head Office once the institute is established.”186 Section VIII, Item D (1) makes 
clear, “All institutes must use the unified set of teaching materials supplied by the Head 
Office.”187 If Confucius Institutes have to work within these parameters then “one can 
see how some of these provisions might create problems or tensions between the 
headquarters and the overseas Confucius Institutes.”188 
These laws of the Confucius Institutes also limit the academic liberty of the 
teachers and students by directing that they “shall not contravene concerning the laws and 
regulations of China” and “shall not involve or participate in any activities that are not 
consistent with the missions of the Confucius Institute.”189 Financing the establishment 
of the Confucius Institutes in international universities and demanding them to speak only 
that which is in line with Beijing’s policies does not come into the sphere of soft power. 
“The concern has been that Hanban will have a great deal of power in influencing 
teaching and other language and cultural promotion activities, either directly or 
indirectly.”190 
 Attracting Foreign Students d.
There is a general consensus about China’s steady increase in its support for 
cultural and education exchanges. China is also making efforts to attract foreign students 
to study in China. China had been offering scholarships to African students who, before 
undergoing their professional courses in medicine, technology, engineering, etc., have to 
spend two years learning Chinese language. Students from East Asian countries are also 
attracted to study in China on self-finance. As Wuthnow has cited, there were 140,000 
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foreign students studying in China in 2006, out of which 75 percent were East Asians.191 
China is also investing billions of dollars to upgrade its universities to bring those at par 
with leading universities in the world. To that end, China is not only providing the latest 
research facilities in these universities, but is also hiring leading academics by offering 
attractive packages.192  
What is attracting these foreign students to study in China? Better education 
facilities, cheaper education, the attraction of Chinese Culture, or better job or business 
opportunities by studying in the fastest growing economy of the world? As per a report 
by Wei Wanchuan, “A 2003 survey of 100 Southeast Asian students in a Chinese 
university revealed that 43 percent of the respondents chose ‘interest in Chinese culture’, 
as opposed to 31 percent who cited ‘future job needs’, as the primary reason of learning 
Chinese.”193  The number of foreign students over the past decade has tripled to 110,000 
from 36,000,194 out of which, seventy five percent of the students majored in academic 
disciplines of cultural concern.195  
 Chinese Studying Abroad e.
 A large number of Chinese are also part of the university students in all of the 
developed countries and “form either the largest or second largest proportion of foreign 
students in Japan, the USA, the UK, Australia, and Canada,”196 which “implies a 
growing Chinese presence amid an intellectual and social bonding of social elites; also 
that Mandarin is likely to become an important international business language, 
especially in Asia.”197 
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 Tourism f.
Easing immigration requirements has allowed Chinese natives the ability to travel 
and conduct business, thereby encouraging the Chinese sense of culture and the Chinese 
language through mutual interaction. The trade organization of Chinese labor contractors 
states that “the number of Chinese workers heading abroad is rising by nearly 20 percent 
per year; some will overstay their visa and never come home.”198 As per various sources, 
there are up to 300,000 Chinese travelers who have travelled to South Africa,199 whereas, 
around 120,000 Chinese migrants entered Thailand alone in 2003.200 The number of 
Chinese migrants to other parts of Asia is even larger than that. Not only are these 
migrants changing the demographic of these regions, but they are growing China’s power 
and spreading Chinese culture by means of local businesses, agricultural sectors, and 
daily person-to-person contact.201 A huge increase is seen in the number of Chinese 
visiting foreign countries. On average there is an increase of more than 8 million Chinese 
per year visiting abroad. This is demonstrated in Figure 7.  
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 Increase in Inbound and Outbound Tourists of China202 Figure 7.
 
 
According to Hunter, “The phenomenon of positive cultural interaction between 
China and its neighbors is reinforced by growing international tourism to China and of 
Chinese tourists to overseas holiday destinations.”203 Despite the efforts of the Chinese 
government to attract overseas tourists, the number of inbound tourists had been slightly 
declining. The trend of tourists visiting China remained upward till 2007, but then 
suddenly started declining and remained so until 2014.Other than appreciation in Chinese 
currency, which led to an increase in travel expenditure in China, Chinese “traditional 
travel itineraries and products lack novelty and competitiveness,”204 which force the 
tourists to move to destinations other than China. Corruption in China has also 
contributed to lowering the image of China among overseas tourists. Foreign visitors are 
also worried by air pollution and the hygienic condition of Chinese food market.205  
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 Chinese Media: Expanding with Questionable Reliability  g.
Until 1978, the Chinese international media under the communist regime of China 
was limited to crude propaganda: “translations of The Little Red Book, the Pravda-like 
Beijing Review, and two rather bizarre English language illustrated propaganda 
monthlies.”206 Now China has not only achieved success in movies, but China is 
dominating the Chinese language media of East Asia with its news coverage and music 
industry. Chinese media domination is not limited to Chinese language only; China has 
also invested heavily in English language news and entertainment media as well.207 
According to Nye,  
In 2009, Beijing announced plans to spend billions of dollars to develop 
global media giants to compete with Bloomberg, Time Warner and 
Viacom. China invested $8.9 billion in external publicity work, including 
a 24hour Xinhua cable news channel designed to imitate Al Jazeera.208 
State-controlled media is another weakness by which China cannot influence the 
international audience who are used to liberal media. “It will be some time before the 
Chinese mass media, with its lack of competitiveness caused by strict government 
restrictions on the media, can start winning large audiences abroad.”209 Not allowing free 
access to foreign media inside China was another hurdle that was to be removed. It is 
since 2007 that China permitted international media agencies to conduct interviews with 
people and organizations without the regime’s approval. Now that the step has been 
initiated, it is not fully exploited.210   
 Foreign Policy 2.
 Foreign Policy: As a Source of Soft Power a.
A government’s political values and foreign policies are another source of soft 
power. Classic realists consider relationships between states to depend on notions of 
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honor and reputation.211 In fact, Hans J. Morgenthau defines prestige as one of the three 
forms of foreign policy. This policy of prestige has the function of “impress[ing] other 
nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, 
or want the other nations to believe, it possesses.”212  
While political and cultural elements support power such a projection, a nation’s 
foreign policy is still subject to change under the governments’ control.213 It can be 
expected that countries will follow policy that supports their national interest; however, 
how their interests are defined is subject to change.214 Relatedly, soft power can inform 
foreign policy because the state is seen as a moral authority, and here it has a greater 
opportunity to employ its agenda in a method that causes others states to fail in 
expressing different preferences because their desires seem to be unrealistic in 
comparison. According to Nye, 
... co-optive (soft) power is the ability of a country to structure a situation 
so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways 
consistent with its own. This power tends to arise from such resources as 
cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of 
international regimes.215 
Nye believes that a strong foreign policy should focus on maintaining cultural and 
public diplomacy, advocating transferring public goods, partaking in multilateral 
cooperation, and advocating for human rights.216 In this sense, policy based on broadly 
held principles is likely to invite cooperation. Foreign policies, if perceived as moral and 
legitimate, can contribute to a state’s soft power. Enough soft power, once accumulated, 
allows a country to gain a manipulative position by which it “makes others fail to express 
some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.”217 In Lundestad’s assessment, 
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during the second half of the 1900s, U.S.-led Cold War coalitions were based on this 
sense of shared principles. In the case of the United States and its allies, these values 
were notions of democracy, federalism, and free markets.218 But later on, the United 
States’ decision to invade Iraq in 2003, similar to unpopular policies with respect to 
Vietnam, brought American soft power to decline. In the case of China, Mao Zedong’s 
foreign policy portrayed the image of China as an ideologically threatening state.219 
Beijing’s past use of military force to settle its strategic issues was not received well. Its 
multiple clashes in the South China Sea and occupation of one of the Spratly islands only 
supported this fact. But the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 is considered as a turning point 
in Beijing’s foreign policy. 
 Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy Over the Years b.
Post-Mao leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reformed China’s 
foreign policy while adopting less confrontational and a rather more constructive 
approach to deal with global and regional affairs.220 In the 1980s, with the same guidance 
in mind, China started adjusting its foreign relations with a view to attain a peaceful 
international environment. Learning from the lessons of its foreign policy of the Mao Era, 
and most importantly learning from the experience of the international communism 
movement, the CCP reformed its foreign policy guidelines for the attainment of a new 
international order.221 In summary, China’s new concept of desired international order 
includes the following guidelines:  
(1) Every state has the right to choose its own social political, economic 
systems and development roads, any state (especially great powers) should 
not interfere with other countries’ internal affairs, and should not impose 
its values, ideologies and development models onto other countries; (2) 
Mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity; (3) International 
disputes should be settled by peaceful negotiations on a just basis; (4) 
States have equal rights to engage in the coordination of world issues; 
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power politics and hegemonism are to be blamed and should be done away 
with; (5) Reform the existing old international economic order, and a new 
international economic order based on justice, equality and mutual 
benefits should replace the old one; (6) the UN should play a full and key 
role in establishing the new international order.222  
With the same guidelines, despite a few missteps, China made great successes in 
foreign relations during the 1980s and 1990s. Beijing was not only successful in creating 
a comparatively more favorable international environment for its national economic 
edifice, but pushed it further to gain more liberal economic policy. China’s international 
situation has developed further during the 21st century. China has adopted a more 
flexible approach in bilateral relations, engaged itself more in multilateral organizations, 
and shown a more responsible approach towards security issues. “The changes represent 
an attempt by Chinese leaders to rebuild its post-Tiananmen national image, protect and 
promote Chinese economic interests, and enhance their security.”223 
 Peaceful Rise and Peaceful Development: Rebutting China’s Military c.
Threat  
Being cognizant of the fact that the world is apprehensive about China’s rise and 
its potential implications, Chinese officials offered many narratives which portrayed 
China as a peace seeking country. The first was China’s promulgation of “New Security 
Concept” in 19997 by President Jiang Zemin to replace “Old Cold War security outlook.” 
This concept advocated “mutual trust and benefit, equality, interdependence, cooperative 
security, and international norms.”224 Then in the spring of 2003, Zheng Bijian, senior 
party adviser, announced Beijing’s policy of “peaceful rise.”225 According to Zheng’s 
statement, the peaceful rise of China is ongoing since 1978 and is likely to continue until 
the mid-21st century.226 Beijing portrays a message that its growing economy, coupled 
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with political and military might, will not only promote peaceful trade, but will contribute 
to global security and address transitional challenges as well.227  
The significance of the concept of the peaceful rise theory as was proposed in the 
Hu Jintao era, was in effect a reflection of an intention of the Chinese government to 
declare the expansion of China’s national power and its presumed rise to global power 
status, with a view to convince neighboring Asian countries to accept this declaration.228 
The contents of the peaceful rise theory are relatively simple. Zheng Bijian, has 
presented four arguments to support his China’s peaceful rise theory. First, despite the 
fact that China’s economic development is quite rapid, which it achieved in a very short 
period of time, it had to start from a very low level, so still it is not that significant where 
the country’s leadership has to accommodate a population of 1.3 billion. So China still 
needs to focus all its efforts on its internal development for the next few decades. Second, 
China’s development strategy is not to detach itself from the international community, 
but to increase its participation. Third, while China is pursuing independent development 
strategies, it does not pursue to harm other states. Fourth, the PRC’s current economic 
growth is supporting Asia’s development and stability on the whole.229 
In some Chinese researchers’ view, the implication of the proposal of the peaceful 
rise theory is actually the transformation of China’s foreign policy in three ways: shift to 
neighbor-centered diplomacy instead of American-centered diplomacy; more focused 
diplomatic objectives to gain the role of global leadership rather than merely obtaining an 
acceptable place in international society; and the transformation from economic 
development focused diplomatic strategy to one centered on enhancing its comprehensive 
national power. In a nut shell, the peaceful rise theory symbolically declares the 
transformation of China’s global strategy orientation from internal to external.230 
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After having been mentioned by Premier Wen Jiabao and subsequently by Hu 
Jintao the same month during the 110th birthday celebration of Mao Zedong, the peaceful 
rise theory gained greater visibility. However, since April 2004 the term “peaceful rise” 
was replaced with “peaceful development,” and both Hu and Wen used the later term 
from then on. During a lecture at the Boao Forum in April 2004, Hu Jintao, while 
describing China’s foreign policy, used the term “peaceful development” instead of 
“peaceful rise.” This reflected the decision of the Chinese government not to officially 
use the term “peaceful rise.”231 
The State Council Information Office of China issued a White Paper in December 
2005 which explains the ‘peaceful development theory.’ The document emphasizes that 
peaceful development is inevitable for China’s modernization and development because 
it will create a peaceful global environment and facilitate world peace. It further explains 
that China has relied on its own capabilities and innovation to achieve this development 
while gradually opening up and accommodating globalization trends with an effort to 
realize mutual benefits with other countries. The document also assures that China 
adheres to the principles of peace, cooperation, and development, while endeavoring for 
prosperity.232 
By comparing both theories, the peaceful rise theory and peaceful development 
theory, we can find very little difference in the content of both. Other than the inclusion 
of a new phrase of ‘harmonious world,’ peaceful development is actually a re-terming of 
peaceful rise theory. This leaves us to infer that China has not on the whole discarded the 
ideas presented in the peaceful rise theory. Still, the significance of the change of 
terminology from ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’ cannot be denied. It reflects 
that China still does not want to show the world that it is rising, because rise reflects a 
power transition; development does not.233 
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 Win-Win Strategy: Refuting China’s Economic Threat  d.
During the 1990s, most of the industrialized countries of the world in general and 
ASEAN countries in particular were fearful of ‘China threat,’ which mostly related to the 
economic growth of China coming at the expense of these countries. To address the 
concerns of these countries related to trade and financial stability, China introduced 
various policy options. China’s emphasis on a ‘win-win’ strategy and follow-up actions 
not only help in reducing the economic concerns of these states, but ASEAN countries 
have become more optimistic about China’s growing economy and consider it a driving 
force in economic development in Southeast Asia.234  
After China joined the WTO, ASEAN states got more concerned about their 
markets being flooded with cheaper Chinese goods. They were worried about their 
inability to compete with China’s cheap labor and that they would eventually lose the 
international market.235 These apprehensions were due to the overlapping exports of 
these countries with China’s exports,236 and during recent years these countries have 
been losing their share of export in Japanese and American markets.237 Chinese officials 
have not negated the concerns of these countries, but while acknowledging these, have 
also suggested policy options to address their worries, thereby showing that China’s 
economic growth is not a threat to them.238 China’s growing economy has also increased 
China’s bilateral trade with ASEAN countries, which increased four times from 1997 
until 2004.239 Though this Sino-ASEAN bilateral trade is incomparable with China’s 
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trade with bigger states, it has conveyed the signal that China’s economic growth is a 
driving factor for other all the developing countries. 
 Asia-Focused Foreign Policy: Countering Balancing against China e.
During the past few years, Chinese leaders, with a view to soothe regional states, 
have made orientations to “becoming friends and partners with neighbors (yulinweishan, 
yilinweiban),” and have labeled China as a “friendly elephant (youhao de daxiang)” 
which will build an “amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighborhood.”240 China had 
been expressing the same type of statements for its neighbors even in the past, which 
conveyed the message of trust and assurance of friendship. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
while China was expressing the same friendly rhetoric, it attempted to meddle in the 
affairs of Southeast Asian countries by promoting the spread of revolution, which created 
mistrust and suspicion among Southeast Asian countries, and that mistrust lasted for 
years.241 However, during 1990s, PRC has been quite consistent in backing up its 
rhetoric of goodwill and friendship towards ASEAN countries by taking practical steps. 
During the 1990s, Asian officials expressed unease over China’s rapid economic 
development and Beijing’s aggressive foreign policy; China condemned all such claims 
as baseless and suggested that those perceptions of China are actually influenced by the 
Western media’s “China threat theory.”242 It was the time when Chinese officials and 
specialists realized that China’s foreign stance has started “to push the ASEAN countries 
toward joining an anti-China coalition that would hinder China’s economic 
development.”243  
Beijing’s decision of not devaluing the Yuan, an action that would have triggered 
a domino effect of sinking other currencies in the region, was considered as China 
standing up for Asia. This decision, along with Beijing’s limited but generous financial 
bailout of its neighbors, created a great amount of goodwill for Beijing. The Chinese 
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leadership saw the light. Beijing’s third and fourth generation of leaders utilized a 
multifaceted approach in pursuit of its objectives while introducing a plethora of 
“xinsiwei” (new thinking).244 They focused more on multilateralism and image-building 
as the core for China’s new foreign policy. To this end, China is rising to become a 
global power with its use of soft power. It is implementing diplomatic strategies while it 
is also examining its national interests. This is evident in the application of foreign policy 
during China’s Hu Jintao era. As the Chinese President Hu Jintao during his address at 
the 2004 Boao Forum stated,  
The very purpose of China’s foreign policy is to maintain world peace and 
promote common development. China always practices what it preaches. 
Persisting in building good-neighborly relationships and partnerships with 
the neighboring countries, we pursue a policy of bringing harmony, 
security and prosperity to neighbors and dedicate ourselves to 
strengthening mutual trust and cooperation with the fellow Asian 
countries, easing up hot spot tensions, and striving to maintain peace and 
tranquility in Asia.245 
Glosny has identified four goals of Chinese foreign policy: “maintain a stable 
peripheral environment for regime security and economic modernization; improve 
China’s image to reduce fears of an aggressive, threatening China; maintain territorial 
sovereignty and prevent the de jure independence of Taiwan; and increase power and 
influence to become a regional or global great power.”246 Being able to uphold friendly 
commitments with Southeast Asia is critical in attaining the rest of the goals of China’s 
foreign policy. 
China’s security and economic concerns are traditional, which make China’s 
periphery vitally important for China. The collapse of dynasties and internal chaos 
produced by foreign invaders on China’s periphery in the past has casted deep fears in the 
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minds of Chinese decision makers.247 Southeast Asia served as a base to foreigners to 
invade China. There are also the views of different scholars that all the neighboring states 
of China who feel threatened by ‘China’s rise’ may balance against it by adopting more 
pro-U.S. policies, and it may hamper China’s economic development as well. So 
“maintaining good relations with Southeast Asia will help stabilize China’s peripheral 
security environment, allowing China to focus on economic development during the 
‘period of strategic opportunity.’”248 It is also argued that China has to have strong 
footing in its own region, just like other great powers of the past, to reach the status of a 
great power.249  
It is still difficult to conclude whether China has proved itself as a ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ at the international level or has become good neighbor, but seeing China’s 
recent contributions for prosperity and peace, we can say that China has become a better 
neighbor. “China’s active policy to address Southeast Asia’s fears about the future impact 
of a stronger China has made these states more optimistic and hopeful that a more 
powerful China will be a force for peace, stability, and prosperity in the short-to-medium 
term.”250  However, these states are still concerned that in the long term a more powerful 
China may seek hegemony in the region.  
 Emerging as a Responsible Stakeholder f.
(1) Going by the International Norms 
Beijing’s engagement in multilateral organizations, interest in international 
nonproliferation agreements, and increased involvement in  United Nations missions like 
those in East Timor, Liberia, or Haiti is a reflection of China’s positive role in 
international affairs as a responsible great power. Beijing has also played a role of 
responsible mediator between developing nations’ disputes.251 When in early 2003, 
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Thailand and Cambodia were on the verge of a severe border war, China stepped in to 
settle the issue. Wang Yi, Chinese vice foreign minister, invited both Cambodian and 
Thai representatives to Beijing to resolve their differences. Seeing the risk of cessation of 
trade and aid by China, both countries realized that continuing the tension was not 
favorable to either. As a result of successful mediation by China, both countries 
normalized their relationship, and China continued its aid and trade to Thailand and 
Cambodia.252 
Most importantly, China was the major player during Six-Party Talks on the 
North Korean nuclear program. China was the only hope for Washington, Moscow, 
Tokyo, and Seoul to host the six-way talks. China, through increased aid to North Korea, 
was successful in tempting Kim Jong II to come to the negotiation table.253 However, 
once North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party Talks, Beijing not only froze North 
Korea’s holdings in several banks in Macau, but also shut down an oil pipeline to 
Pyongyang. On the North Korea nuclear weapon test, China not only agreed to UN 
sanctions on Pyongyang, but ceased all oil exports to North Korea.254 A non-nuclear 
Pyongyang is also in the self-interest of Beijing, as North Korean nuclear capability will 
enable Kim the ultimate deterrence, which may reduce Beijing’s influence over 
Pyongyang.255But accomplishment in achieving a nuclear-free North Korea would win 
China the respect of all involved nations. 
China’s recent compliance with international norms can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   China’s Compliance with International Norms256 
Item  Compliance History Score 
Sovereignty   One of the strongest defenders  Excellent  
Free trade Has made substantial headway in almost every 
area except the enforcement of intellectual 




and arms control 
 
Currently appears to be fairly comprehensive, 
but a colorful history of noncompliance and 






Routinely being accused of violating this norm 
in the case of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, 
although the accusation at times misconstrues the 
norm (absolute right of any ethnic groups to 
sovereign independence is not recognized in 
international law)  
Fair 
 
Human rights Expanded social/political/religious freedom 
coexists with routine violation of political and 
legal rights; still coddling dictators in the 
developing world; focus on social and economic 





In the late 1990s, Beijing, with a view to guarantee its country’s security, 
introduced a “new security concept” that allowed China to build mutual trust with 
neighboring countries through multilateral organizations. The ‘Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation’ enabled China to end several of its border disputes, as this document 
committed ten countries in the ASEAN to respect the sovereignty and equality of all 
member countries. China signed several bilateral cooperative agreements with several 
Asian countries, which also included the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
agreement. Beijing also originated a code of conduct on the South China Sea.257  
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China not only supported the first East Asia Summit for ASEAN Regional Forum 
but also rendered support in creating an Asia Cooperation Fund.258 China also “joined the 
‘Organization of American States’ as an observer, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank.”259 China also signed an agreement with the Andean Community to establish 
closer relations. To raise cooperation on development, economic, diplomatic, and health 
matters with African countries, China “established a ‘Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation’ in 2000 and the ‘Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and 
Social Development.”260 China also rendered aid to the African Union and had been 
quite vital in the African Development Bank affairs through the increased involvement of 
the Chinese Development Bank.261 
 Limiting Factors g.
(1) Energy-Driven Foreign Policy 
Though Beijing’s procurement of energy resources does not equate to that of 
European or American companies, its investment to secure future energy requirements is 
clearly visible in its foreign policy. Chinese companies have accumulated energy 
holdings in energy-rich countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Nevertheless, the PRC does not need to persuade countries with 
small energy resources. China supported Sudan by financing huge projects that were 
completed before time to create goodwill among the Sudanese public for Dictator Omar 
Bashir.262 Similarly, China offered  greater cooperation and aid to Philippines President 
Macapagal-Arroyo during his state visit to China, with a demand to withdraw Philippine 
troops from Iraq with a view to waver U.S.-Filipino relations.263 What all these countries 
have are energy resources that can feed China’s growing industry, which gives a clear 
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inclination to Chinese foreign policy to have its own favorite government in these 
countries to establish better relations.  
The China-Turkmenistan gas pipeline project agreement is a big step toward this 
where Turkmenistan has realigned its relations away from its former partner in Russia. 
Earlier, Russia and Ukraine had been squeezing Turkmenistan as both countries 
controlled the only export routes for Turkmenistan’s natural gas. With a view to break 
free from Russia’s influence, Turkmenistan has found this project with China a solution 
to its problems.264 Again, a $5 billion business park for the oil industry is to be built 
outside Beijing by a Bahrain developer.265  China’s noninvolvement policy in domestic 
political affairs of smaller nations has swayed these nations to have better relations with 
China. 
(2) Taiwan and One China Policy 
China has used more of its coercive or inducement power instead of its power of 
attraction to deal with Taiwan when it clashes with its ‘One China Policy.’ China had 
been very successful in isolating Taiwan. China has gotten maximum success in Latin 
America and Africa, where countries are abandoning Taipei and have started formally 
recognizing Beijing for closer relations. Economic benefits offered by China have 
influenced Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, Bolivia, Dominica, and Guatemala to shift 
recognition to Beijing.266 The same trend is seen in Africa. Promised aid and economic 
cooperation agreements by China have convinced Liberia, South Africa, Senegal, and the 
Central African Republic to switch their recognition from Taiwan to China. 
Beijing has used a very aggressive stance against those states that still recognize 
Taiwan. Macedonia’s inability to get a peacekeeping bill due to China’s veto in the UN 
Security Council was the cost Macedonia had to pay for its establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. Again in September 2005, at the UN General Assembly, duty-free 
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entry to exports and debt forgiveness was offered by President Hu to the world’s poor 
countries, but this offer was not valid for those countries that recognized Taiwan.267  
In Southeast Asia, the informal embassies of Taiwan have been forced out of 
Cambodia, and Philippine. Indonesian, and Malaysian governments have canceled all 
informal visits to and from Taiwan.268 Beijing has also attempted to entice Australia 
through favorable trade conditions, and high level political visits in an endeavor to sway 
Australia against assisting Americans in case of any war over Taiwan.269 
 To summarize, it is believed by most of the international and Chinese 
scholars that though China has invested heavily in its sources of soft power, but Chinese 
concept of soft power still requires refinement. China is trying to emerge as a 
‘responsible stake holder’ in international affairs by engaging itself multilaterally, yet 
Chinese strong stance on Taiwan and Tibet issues, and the role of energy resources in 
formulation of its foreign policy may limit its success in achieving the desired results out 
of its soft power. China’s over reliance on culture as source of soft power, while 
overlooking the importance of political values as source of soft power could be another 
limiting factor. But question still remains that how successful China is in its efforts of its 
soft power. Next chapter will analyze the success or failure of China’s soft power using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. While using different opinion polls as a 
dependent variable as a basis of the world’s perception about China, various aspects of 
Chinese cultural sources of influence, and economic and military threats are used as 
independent variables. This way I will try to find out the correlation of these aspects with 
the success of Chinese soft power or otherwise.     
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V. CHINESE SOFT POWER: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
The struggle for soft power in Asia is becoming increasingly intense—a race of 
better national image-building through public diplomacy is not less significant than an 
arms race. All the major states are refining their weapons of mass influence and finding 
new strategies to use these more efficiently. Gauging the success achieved by any of the 
states in this multi-faceted market of ideas is quite difficult. It is also quite difficult to 
determine that how much of this stockpile of soft power helped achieve a set objective in 
foreign policy. Public diplomacy can have short- to long-term objectives, for which a 
continuous effort is crucial, so hoping for sudden impacts may not be possible. Co-
relating the efforts and effects in a short span of time may also lead to erroneous analysis.  
At the same time, as the type of public diplomacy effort may vary to influence the 
general public or political elites, so public opinion polls about the image of a particular 
country may not correspond to the thinking of the policy makers of the same country. 
Therefore, one has to be very cautious while inferring about the success achieved by the 
public diplomacy in light of these opinion polls. Sometimes, little or no positive 
correlation between the investments made in public diplomacy and international 
perception of that state may be quite unusual. The results appear to be the same with 
regard to China. As per a Chicago Council on Global Affairs report, Chinese soft power 
has not performed that well as predicted by its “charm offensive.”270 Figure 8 illustrates 
the same story, where the positive perception of people about China has declined over the 
past few years. 
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 China’s Positive Image in the World over the Years271 Figure 8.
 
 
In this section, I try to analyze the success or failure of China’s soft power using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I see how the views about China have 
changed over the years in different parts of the world. Then, I use different opinion polls 
as a dependent variable as a basis of the world’s perception about China. Various aspects 
of Chinese cultural sources of influence, and economic and military threats are used as 
independent variables. Using a t-test, I try to find out the correlation of these aspects with 
the success of Chinese soft power or otherwise.     
A. MEASURING THE SUCCESS 
It may be argued that these poll data do not cover all the aspects of public opinion 
about a particular country, but we still cannot dismiss this option when it comes to 
analyzing the success or failure of a country’s public diplomacy. At the same time, we 
should also be cognizant of the various factors influencing the opinion of people 
surveyed: the timing of the survey conducted and sample selection. To explain these 
factors, Hooge gave the sample poll data of three Western European countries whose 
perception about China kept changing due to China’s changing policies on internal issues 
or the events happening in some other part of the world. This is illustrated in Figure 9.   
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 Change in Views in Western Europeans Who Considered China as Figure 9.




The crackdown of riots in Tibet during the month of March 2008 and criticism by 
international media that followed it may have led to growing concern in Europeans about 
China. These apprehensions were revealed during the poll of April 2008, where we see a 
sudden increase in the percentage of people viewing China as threat, as compared to the 
polls of March of that same year. But China’s widely praised response to the Sichuan 
earthquake brought goodwill for China, which we can see in May’s poll. Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia in August shifted the focus of the media and people towards Russia, 
and in September, people did not view China as that big a threat.273 This explains further 
how important the timing and the sample selection of the surveys are. But despite all 
these limitations, these surveys can still help to a great extent in knowing the perceptions 
of the people about a particular state at some given time.    
B. CHINA: FRIEND OR FOE? 
In a 2005 BBC World Service “survey conducted in 22 states around the world … 
China is viewed as having a mainly positive influence in the world by a majority or 
plurality of citizens in 14 countries. On average across all countries polled (excluding 
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China itself), almost half (48%) see China’s influence as positive and just 30 percent see 
it as negative.”274 Though there had been ups and downs in global perceptions, by 2014 
the percentage of people viewing China’s influence positively came down to 42 percent, 
while same percent viewed it negatively.275 So overall, 18 percent of people’s views 
about China changed from positive to negative during the last 9 years. This is shown in 
Figure 10.  
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These overall figures may suggest that China’s soft power has failed to deliver, 
but yet we cannot draw this conclusion with certainty, as we do not know what would 
have been the world’s perception about China if China’s soft power efforts had not been 
in place. The situation could have been worse for China, which warrants even more 
detailed study of the facts. Figure 10 shows that the most favorable views came during 
the 2012 survey, and this change was only because almost all of the countries of North 
America and the West had their all-time highest positive perception about China. But this 
lasted for only one year. However, the most striking are the results of the 2009 BBC 
Service survey. Conducted just a few months after the Beijing Olympics, this is the only 
time when percentage of people viewing China’s influence negatively was more than the 
people viewing it positively. Within one year, China lost 16 points.  
It is mostly argued that China is posing a threat to the world because of its 
expanding military power and growing economy. But a t-test could not find the 
correlation between the world’s negative perception about China over the last ten years of 
BBC polls (as a dependent variable) with China’s military spending and GDP growth (as 
independent variables). At 95 percent confidence level, the p-values for GDP growth and 
China’s military spending are 0.167654475 and 0.12032469, respectively. Since the value 
for both of the independent variables is greater than 0.025, this means that neither of the 
variables has any significant effect on the world’s negative perception of China. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 11. 
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During the 2012 BBC survey, 30 percent of people having unfavorable views 
about China, mentioned ‘China’s economy, products, and services’ as the reason for their 
negative perception about China. But this was the same reason 50 percent of the people 
perceived China’s influence in the world favorably.277 In a 2014 Pew survey, 53 percent 
of people viewed the growing economy of China as a good thing for their countries, 
while only 23 percent considered it otherwise.278 In the same survey, once the Asian 
public was asked about their top choice of country as ally or threat, the majority of three 
countries—Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam—viewed China as a threat (see Figure 
12).279 Though no recent BBC poll data is available for China’s perception in the 
Philippines and Vietnam, China has had an extremely negative perception in Japan for 
the last ten years. Even in a 2014 BBC survey, only 3 percent of Japanese viewed China 
positively. The majority of Americans regard Russia as its biggest threat, whereas for 
most Indians, Pakistan is a threat. So it can be argued that though it is quite difficult to 
rewrite the historical narratives with only decades of soft power. We might also, 
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however, contribute this to the success of Chinese soft power, which has been able to 
sway the world of its ‘peaceful development’. 
As per a Gallup Poll survey of 2013, 24 percent of people viewed the United 
States as the biggest threat to global peace, followed by Pakistan with 8 percent and 
China by 6 percent.280 Although the United States is widely viewed as posing the greatest 
threat to global peace, the results of the same survey show that it is still the most desired 
country to live in. The polls conducted just after the controversial airstrikes by the United 
States on Syria may have shaped the perception of the public about the United States, 
whereas, Pakistan’s unenviable position got this boost from its neighbor and arch rival, 
India, which is home to 15 percent of the world’s population. This also reflects that 
though the perception of the international public about China may be deteriorating, 
people do not feel threatened by China’s rise. The reason of this decline may lie in mostly 
political values. In a 2012 BBC survey, 27 percent of people mentioned China’s way of 
treating its people as the reason for their disapproval, followed closely by 25 percent who 
considered China’s foreign policy as the main reason for their negative views about 
China.281 
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C. REGION-WISE PERCEPTION VARIATION 
The impact of Chinese soft power varies with each region (see Figure 13). Despite 
a few ups and downs observed during the last ten years of BBC survey reports, China is 
mostly viewed favorably in Africa and Latin America. On average, China’s favorability 
graph is rising in these regions by 1.37 percent per year in Africa and 0.42 percent per 
year in Latin America. In rest of the world, positive views about China are at a decline. In 
the developed world of North America and Europe, on average, Chinese favorability is 
dropping at a rate of 1.19 percent per year and 0.32 percent per year, respectively. The 
most shocking decline in positive perception about China is seen in its own 
neighborhood. In Asia, every year 1.56 percent Asians do not see China favorably 
anymore.  
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 Region-wise Positive Views about China283 Figure 13.
 
 
However, within each region, one can find different impacts of Chinese public 
diplomacy on different countries. In the next few paragraphs, I discuss each region and 
how people view China in different countries of these regions. As discussed earlier, 
China is seen more favorably in Africa and Latin America, so I try to find out the 
relationship between various aspects of soft power and better perception-building by 
China in these regions.  
 Asia-Tough Neighborhood  1.
Perceptions of China were better in Asia in 2005, when “55 percent of people 
viewed Chinese influence as mainly positive.”284 However, in later BBC polls, China’s 
image in Asia declined in spite of its huge efforts in its soft power. As of 2014, around 40 
percent of Asians hold positive views about China. This is even below the global average, 
which is 42 percent. However, in 2014, these positive perceptions among Asians match 
with negative views about China, which have increased to 42 percent as compared to 
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2005’s negative views of 24 percent. An overview of these statistics is provided in Figure 
14.  




Despite the decline of China’s positive influence among Asian countries, it is still 
ahead of the United States and India, who both are considered by 36 percent of Asians to 
have positive influence in the world. At the same time, both of these countries have lesser 
negative perceptions in Asian states as compared to China. Another survey conducted in 
2015 by the Pew Research Center reported, “Publics in the Asia-Pacific region generally 
see each other favorably, with a few exceptions that reflect deeper historical antagonisms, 
especially between China, Japan and South Korea”285 (see Figure 15 for views of Asians 
about each other), and the same is the case between India and Pakistan. As the data of the 
survey further revealed, the younger generation of these countries had better opinions of 
other states of the same region. So we can say that the soft power of these countries is 
somehow influencing the mindset of the general public, if not completely so. 
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 How Asians View Each Other286 Figure 15.
 
 
China realizes that its economic and military might may frighten its neighbors the 
most. This fear may force these countries to balance against China through alliances with 
the United States and other Western countries. But if China is successful in convincing its 
neighbors of its ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘win-win’ slogans through public diplomacy, then 
these Asian countries may not feel the need to balance against China. It is through the 
success of the United States’ policies that Canada and Mexico do not feel the need to 
seek help from any external power to deal with the United States.287    
 North America and the West: Tough Turf for China 2.
China, which had 41 percent positive views in North America and Western 
Europe in 2005, has come down to around 28 percent by 2014. The only time China had 
the most favorable views in these regions was during 2012, when 44 percent people of 
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these countries viewed China’s influence in the world as positive. But at the same time, 
positive views about China dropped in Russia by 6 points. This reflects the challenge 
faced by Chinese soft power, which has to find balance while interacting with different 
ideologies. These results are visible in Figure 16. 





China has to gain much in Europe to achieve the desired results from its soft 
power. During the 1990s, Europeans were optimistic about China and perceived that 
political reforms would follow the liberal economy of China. During that honeymoon 
period, Americans and Europeans gave China the benefit of the doubt and viewed it more 
favorably. But the situation changed after 2006, when the growing trade deficit of all of 
these countries with China and the human rights situation within China made all 
countries more worried about the future intentions of China. The perceptions about China 
among these countries vary significantly. If Europeans see China as an economic 
competitor and are worried about the political values of China, Americans are found 
doubtful about the ‘peaceful rise’ rhetoric of China. 
                                                 

















Political values and human rights issues are the biggest liabilities for Chinese soft 
power in the Western world. Europeans do not approve of the authoritative nature of the 
Chinese regime. China tries to persuade all of these democratic developed countries with 
the idea of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ by advocating that a person “should 
be able to feed himself before he can cast a ballot.”289 Europeans, while seeing the 
world’s biggest foreign currency reserves held by China, are not convinced by China’s 
view point that China, still being a developing country, cannot give much priority to civil 
and political rights. 
The Tibet issue has also gained much attention in Europe after 2008. The PRC’s 
crackdown on Tibetan protestors during 2008 also became one of the biggest reasons for 
the decline in positive perception about China in Western world. The Harris Poll of 2008 
finds 53 percent of the British, 67 percent of the French, and 74 percent of Germans 
holding the opinion that China should not be ruling Tibet.290  
 Africa and Latin America: China’s Growing Influence 3.
Continuous increase or steadiness in the positive perception of China in Africa 
and Latin America is proof of its growing impact in these regions. Except for Mexico and 
Argentina, the positive views in these countries generally remained more than 40 percent. 
In a 2004 BBC survey, 46 percent of the public of Latin America perceived China’s 
influence in the world positively, which was the same even during the 2014 BBC survey. 
However, in African countries, this positive perception grew from 55 percent to 65 
percent during 10 years. These results are shown in Figure 17.  
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 Positive Views about China in Africa and Latin America291 Figure 17.
 
 
Is this success in these regions due to the public diplomacy of China or something 
else? To find the reason behind this success, I ran a t-test based on the data of Pew’s 
Global Attitude Survey of 2013. I tried to find the correlation between the positive image 
of China (as a dependent variable) and the views of the same public about different tools 
of China’s soft power (as an independent variable): China’s respect of personal freedom, 
China’s business practices, China’s entertainment industry, China’s development in 
science and technology, and  Chinese ideas and customs. The p-values for all 
independent variables are greater than 0.025, which means that neither of them is 
significant enough on the 95 percent confidence level to have played a role in positive 
perception building of China among publics of these countries. Though people had a lot 
of admiration of China’s development in science and technology and they also liked the 
business practices of China, China scored worst on the cultural aspect. Chinese music and 
movies are unable to attract the people of foreign countries. People also did not like the 
spreading of Chinese ideas and customs.292 These results are shown in Figure 17. 
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Kurlantzick also considers the Chinese development model to have made a 
considerable impression in the developing world: 
China seems to have enjoyed striking success and poverty reduction that 
other developing countries can’t help but notice. At the same time, the 
Washington Consensus has failed many developing nations. During the 
late 1980s and 1990s, many African and Latin American nations opened 
their economies, slashed their tariffs and undertook other painful 
economic reforms, yet few nations in either Latin America or Africa saw 
their economies take off.294 
Economic aid and investment have been playing a major role in perception 
building of China in Africa and Latin America. In Latin American countries, 39 
commercial agreements were signed in November 2004 by Chinese President Hu, with 
huge investments of US$20 billion in Argentina alone.295 A key agreement on oil and gas 
explorations was also signed in 2005 by Vice President Zeng with Venezuelan President 
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Hugo Chavez.296 “By 2005, China had offered more than US$50 billion of investment to 
countries within the U.S. ‘backyard’, and has pursued a similar strategy in sub-Saharan 
African countries.”297  
D. CAUSES/LIMITATIONS OF CHINESE SOFT POWER 
The results from other surveys like the Gallup Poll, Pew Global Attitudes Project 
Survey, and Nation Brands Index are almost the same as that of the BBC World Service 
polls where China could not show a steady score on the soft power index.  Even when we 
disaggregate soft power into its cultural, economic, foreign relations, and political values 
dimensions, China still lags behind many developed states. It scored worst on public 
perceptions about political dimensions of soft power as compared to cultural and 
economic dimensions. So divergent to the belief that public diplomacy shapes public 
opinion,298 efforts put in by the United States, India, and particularly the recent surge of 
public diplomacy in China vis-à-vis the perceptions of the world about these countries 
suggests that there is little evidence to propose that all such efforts in public diplomacy 
had some positive effects.  
The positive effects of all such efforts changed public perceptions into negative 
ones due to some domestic or international event. Sometimes, all the tools of soft power 
could not follow the parallel or convergent paths that could have maintained or boosted 
the positive image. But any divergent action in the economic, diplomatic, or domestic 
political values sphere cast a negative influence on the perceived image of the state. If the 
recent involvement of the United States in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries caused 
the decline in the positive image of the United States, it helped China to gain positive 
scores. Similarly, U.S. policies in Afghanistan and India and drone strikes inside Pakistan 
created the vacuum of goodwill to be filled in quickly by China. In the case of China, its 
actions at home and abroad and its concept of state sovereignty makes it difficult for the 
PRC to promote itself.  
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In Nye’s view, the countries whose culture is closer to prevailing norms, whose 
international and domestic actions boost their credibility, and who can influence the 
framing of issues by virtue of holding and accessing multiple channels of 
communications would succeed in  projecting their soft power.299 Some of the ideals held 
by China not only clash with existing international norms, but China also lacks credibility 
in the exercise of its public diplomacy. As Peter Ford cited Gong Wenxiang, a journalism 
professor, “If the medium lacks credibility, it is unthinkable that it will improve the 
country’s image.”300 China’s political system, based on the state-centered model, and the 
issue of credibility are closely linked. The foreign audience does not trust the state 
organizations of China as messengers. Opaque political decision-making, the 
authoritative nature of the Chinese government, and the perceived mastery of the Chinese 
on the use of propaganda raises question marks on the legitimacy of all statements made 
by any communication medium on behalf of its people. This control mechanism hampers 
the utility of China’s soft power.   
Of course, we are not sure what perceptions the international community might 
have about China in a counterfactual scenario, had China not invested so much in its tools 
of mass influence. But China could not achieve that big bang that Chinese policy makers 
may have expected as a result of their heavy investment in the application of Chinese soft 
power. But despite all these highs and lows in either negative or positive perceptions 
about China, when we compare China’s performance with other states in the world like 
the United States, India, or Japan, we find the similar tidal results. We can also argue that 
China’s fate may have been similar to North Korea, which unlike China, hardly put in 
any efforts in building its soft power using public diplomacy and as a result is suffering a 
statistically considerable decline in international perceptions.  
China may have been successful in changing the opinion of the common public or 
elites of other countries through public diplomacy, but how much of an affect it had on 
the policy formulation of those countries towards China cannot be ascertained. One 
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aspect of it is that the policy-making process is quite complex; sometimes governments 
may formulate policies as per the wishes of the masses, but sometimes these policies 
might also go against the public demand due to so many other considerations. “In all 
likelihood, however, most signals sent through public diplomacy are simply lost in the 
overwhelming noise created by all of the other ideas at play.”301 In such a situation, 
China may fail to achieve its desired results owing to so many other forces at play.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
As China is progressing and its national power is increasing, it faces multiple 
challenges in projecting its soft power. It not only has to rid itself from the the 
international perception of ‘China threat theory,’ but it also has to convince its 
neighboring Asian countries to accept its rise willingly. It is only after this that China can 
secure the right to speak in international affairs as a responsible power. Though peaceful 
rise theory was introduced with the same purpose, Beijing still faced the challenge of 
justifying its declaration of its rise to the international community. Through this theory, 
China wanted to make its rise public, with a view to seek acknowledgement of its 
neighboring countries; at the same time Chinese officials are apprehensive of probable 
negative reactions from other nations. As a consequence, the peaceful development 
theory replaced the peaceful rise theory, but that change is only in name and not in the 
content of the newly introduced theory. In any case, China will watchfully implement its 
foreign policy under the guideline of the peaceful development theory and will continue 
working to strengthen its status in Asia. 
If on one hand, I could not find any significant relation between China’s tools of 
soft power and its positive perception building in the international community, I could 
also not find any significant effect of China’s rise on negative perception building among 
the international community about China. We cannot say with certainty whether or not 
China’s soft power has succeeded, as there are still many obstacles in China’s path to 
strengthen its influence through soft power. An authoritarian political system, widespread 
corruption, Beijing’s concept of sovereignty, a flaccid human rights realization, and 
illiberal capitalism are a few major hurdles that China has to cross to win international 
support in recognition of its peaceful rise.  
As the data of different polls has indicated, China’s perception is different in 
different parts of the world. China may have had the chance of achieving goodwill in 
developing countries due to their economic interests or impressing their elites through the 
‘Chinese development model,’ but achieving a positive perception in the West remains an 
uphill task for Chinese public diplomacy. It would require a liberal political system, just 
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like a liberal economy. If another analysis is done with more sophistication, it may be 
revealed that the projection of soft power by any country has to be tailored as per the 
suitability of the mindset of the public of a particular region. Alan Hunter has suggested 
three key areas for China: “developed countries; developing countries; and the 
neighbouring region of Southeast Asia.”302  
However, to correctly analyze China’s soft power, we need to shift our attention 
from China’s rapid economic and military growth, and rather focus more on how China is 
achieving that growth. China needs to keep a balance between Chinese and international 
trends. While expressing in its own way, China must also bear in mind that the only 
favorable way of communication is that which can be understood and accepted globally. 
China should continue its endeavors to be a responsible stake holder to achieve its 
peaceful rise in a way that can satisfy the international community.   
The success of China’s soft power will depend on the sources China uses to 
achieve its desired effects. China’s over-reliance on culture may not yield the results 
China has in mind. People may be attracted to Chinese food or art, but this may not shape 
their perception about the Chinese government. A large number of people are learning the 
Chinese language, and there is also a steady increase in tourists visiting China, but it 
cannot be an indicator of China’s attraction. Motives could be business-oriented as well.  
When we compare the Chinese concept of soft power with the concept practiced 
by any other developed country, it becomes evident that the Chinese concept lacks 
confidence. One hardly finds Chinese analysts discussing political values to be 
incorporated in the Chinese concept of soft power. They either totally neglect or 
downplay the role of political values in projecting China’s soft power. While the 
American or any other democratic country’s concept of soft power discusses the socio-
political system, Chinese authors stress the relative nature of Chinese culture. This 
concept of relativity if on one side is to convince the world that Western cultural 
ideologies cannot suit the Chinese environment, it also conveys the message that political 
values also have to conform to the culture and history of the state. Talking about political 
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values may endanger the legitimacy of the CCP. “This is perhaps why official documents 
or statements emphasize the role of culture to the extent of overlooking political values, 
as a source of China’s soft power.”303 
China without doubt has invested a lot in projecting its soft power. China has 
allotted considerable financial resources in projecting its positive image in the world 
through organizing grand cultural activities throughout the world, sponsoring Confucius 
Institutes in so many countries, and enhancing the capacity and reach of its mass media. 
China has invested billions of dollars in Africa and Latin America to establish a foothold. 
Yet “Chinese intellectuals seem uncertain about the ultimate destiny of China’s soft 
power.”304 Many scholars who have analyzed the effectiveness and impact of Chinese 
soft power have mostly reached the conclusion that  “Soft power remains Beijing’s 
underbelly and China still has a long way to go to become a true global leader.”305 Many 
may be fearful about China’s ‘charm offensive,’ but most of the studies of not only 
western scholars, but Chinese authors as well, suggest that China has to do much more to 
achieve the ‘big bang’ that Beijing has in mind.   
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